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Abstract
We revisit the revenue comparison of standard auction formats, including rst-price,
second-price, and English auctions. We rank auctions according to their revenue guarantees, i.e., the greatest lower bound of revenue across all informational environments,
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Introduction

In auction theory, the revenue equivalence theorem is a central result that helps us understand the relationship between the choice of auction format and the resulting revenue. In an
environment with

independent private values, it states the surprising result that many stan-

dard auction formats, including rst-price, second-price, and English auctions, all deliver the
same expected revenue (Myerson, 1981). By contrast, in an environment with

aliated val-

ues, there is a revenue ranking theorem that establishes that the rst-price auction achieves
less revenue than the second-price auction which in turn generates less revenue than the
English auction (Milgrom and Weber, 1982, hereafter MW). Against this background, we
provide a new revenue ranking theorem for environments with common or interdependent
values, one that reverses the received ranking when values are aliated. Subsequently, we
also establish a new revenue equivalence theorem under favorable equilibrium selection.
For a given auction format, say the rst-price auction, the resulting auction outcome is
conventionally analyzed for a xed distribution of the values of the bidders

and

for a xed

information structure that generates the signals that the bidder have before submitting their
bids. Revenue and welfare in any given auction can be strongly aected by the specic form
of information, e.g., Fang and Morris (2006) and Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2017a,
hereafter BBM). This presents a challenge for comparative auction theory, since it may
be dicult to pin down the correct model of information, either through introspection or
measurement. Given such, we propose to rank auctions by a criterion that is less sensitive
to misspecication of the informational environment.
tion according to its

revenue guarantee :

In particular, we evaluate an auc-

the greatest lower bound on the auction's revenue

that holds across all information structures. Importantly, this guarantee is computed while
holding xed the payo environmentthat is, the distribution over the bidders' values.
We establish a revenue guarantee ranking for the auctions studied in the aliated value
model of MW, namely the rst-price auction, the second-price auction and the English auction. Our main results are exposited for the case of pure common values, with an extension
to interdependent values in Section 5. A rst step to obtain a revenue guarantee ranking is
to establish the revenue guarantee of the rst-price auction. Here we appeal to an earlier
result in BBM that establishes that the lowest revenue in the rst-price auction arises in
an information structure that we refer to as a maximum signal model.

This information

structure which supports the lowest revenue is one in which the bidders receive identical and
independent signals, and the value of the object equals the maximum of all the signals.
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We then ask what is the equilibrium revenue in the maximum signal model of the secondprice and the English auction. Here, we obtain the rst surprising result. In this specic
common value model, there is an equilibrium in which bidders behave as if each bidder's
value is equal to their individual signal rather than the common value given by the maximum
signal. Thus, the bidders act as if they are in an independent private value environment,
and all but the bidder with highest signal bid as if their value is lower than their true value.
Given this

strategic equivalence

with the independent private value model, we can appeal to

the standard revenue equivalence result to conclude that all three auctions generate the same
revenue in the maximum signal information structure. As a result, the revenue guarantee
of the second-price auction or the English auction can be

at most equal

to the revenue

guarantee of the rst-price auction. Strategic equivalence, and hence the revenue guarantee
ranking, can be extended to any standard auction that admits an equilibrium in monotonic
pure-strategies in the independent private-value model.
Note that the revenue guarantee for the rst-price auction in BBM is valid across all

equilibria, as well as all information structures.

But given that the second-price and English

auction have other, less revenue-favorable equilibria, the revenue guarantee of the rst-price
auction must be strictly higher than those of second-price and English auctions.

Thus,

Theorem 1 reverses the revenue ranking established in MW.
At the same time, second-price and English auctions have compelling equilibria in monotonic pure strategies when the information structure admits a strong ordering on signals, e.g.,
when values are aliated. We may ask, what is the revenue guarantee ranking if we restrict
attention to symmetric aliated values and monotonic equilibria? This approach is similar
to the revenue equivalence theorem with symmetric independent private values which establishes the equivalence result in well-behaved informational environments and under favorable
equilibrium selection.
Theorem 2 shows that in the aliated common-value model, rst-price, second-price and
English auction are

revenue guarantee equivalent.

This result is established by showing that

the critical maximum signal model is itself aliated, so that the weak ranking of Theorem
1 is preserved. At the same time, it is a result of MW that the rst-price auction generates

weakly lower

revenue than the other auction formats when restricting attention to favorable

equilibria that excludes bidding ring like equilibria for the second-price and English auction.
We therefore conclude that all of these mechanisms must have exactly the same revenue
guarantee in aliated environments and under monotonic equilibria. The maximum signal
model thus has a remarkable property. If we take as a measure of the winner's curse the
dierence between the expected value of the object and the expected equilibrium revenue,
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then the maximum signal model maximizes the winner's curse uniformly across all three
auction formats.

1

Thus, Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 oer a dierent perspective of the revenue ranking
result in the aliated value model. If we are concerned with the robustness of the revenue
comparison across all informational environments, we nd that the English auction, and the
second-price auction lose their advantage, as stated in the revenue guarantee equivalence
theorem.

Moreover, if we are at the same time concerned with the equilibrium selection,

and seek to oer a revenue guarantee that is valid across all information structures and all
equilibria then we nd that the rst-price auction oers better guarantees than either the
second-price or the English auction.
In light of our results, a natural question is: what is the mechanism with the greatest
revenue guarantee?

This question is answered by Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2016)

when there are two bidders and binary common values and by Brooks and Du (2018) for general common value models. The revenue-guarantee maximizing auctions look quite dierent
from the standard auctions considered here, and necessarily involve randomized allocations
to optimally hedge ambiguity about the information structure. We view these results as complementary to our revenue guarantee rankings: revenue guarantees are one of many criteria
that could be used in selecting an auction format, and while the standard auctions considered
here do not achieve optimal revenue guarantee, they have other desirable attributes aside
from revenue guarantees.
Our analysis shares the interest in performance guarantees that is at the core of much
recent work on auction theory in theoretical computer science, see e.g. Roughgarden et al.
(2017). The majority of these results obtains guarantees through approximation algorithms.
By contrast, the central revenue guarantee that emerged from the rst-price auction here
arises as an exact equilibrium of a critical information structure, namely the maximum signal
model.
We establish Theorem 1 and 2 for common values with aliated signals. Towards the end
we discuss extensions of these results to more general settings. We consider interdependent
rather than common values. We argue that the revenue guarantee ranking extends immediately to more general interdependent value environments. Thus, the earlier restriction to
common values is done for simplicity of exposition rather than logical necessity. Extending
revenue guarantee equivalence is more subtle, but there is a sharp sense in which this result

1 Bulow

and Klemperer (2002) were the rst to study the maximum signal model in the context of secondprice auctions. They showed that bidding one's signal is an equilibrium and that the resulting revenue is less
than what the seller would obtain with a posted price. Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2017b) characterize
the optimal auction in the maximum signal model. They show that the posted price is optimal when the
good must be sold, but otherwise the optimal mechanism has a dierent form.
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would also extend to more general environments. Finally, we give extensions to rankings of
other mechanisms, including those with reserve prices.

2

Model

There are

N

bidders for a single unit of a good. The set of bidder indices is

Bidders' values

(v1 , . . . , vN )

are jointly distributed according to a measure

N = {1, . . . , N }.
π (dv1 , . . . , dvN ).

For our main results, we will consider environments where values are common. We will
say that the environment is
case, we denote by

[v, v]

H (v)

common-values

if

v1 = · · · = vN

the cumulative distribution of the bidders' common value, and let

denote the convex hull of its support. We assume that

An

information structure

measure

µ (ds1 , . . . , dsN )

with probability one. In this

H

is non-atomic.

consists of measurable sets of signals

on signal proles in

S = S1 × · · · × SN ,

Si ,

a joint probability

and a measurable interim

expected value function

w : S → RN ,
where

w (s)

is interpreted as the interim expectation of the value prole conditional on the

signals. We say that

w

is

consistent with the prior π

(or simply

consistent )

if

v ∼π

is a

s ∼ µ, meaning that there is a random variable 
that is correlated with s such that E [|s] = 0 and w (s) +  is distributed according to π . A
representative information structure is denoted I .
An information structure is symmetric if S1 = · · · = SN , π is exchangeable, and w is
symmetric, in the sense that for all permutations ξ : N → N , we have

mean-preserving spread of

w (s)

where


wξ(i) sξ(1) , . . . , sξ(N ) = wi (s1 , . . . , sN ) .
An information structure has
is

private values

if

wi is constant in s−i .

independent if the si are independent random variables.
A mechanism consists of measurable sets of messages Mi

allocations

q : M → [0, 1]N

with

PN

i=1 qi

(m) ≤ 1

for all

An information structure

for each player,

m,

M = ×N
i=1 Mi ,

and transfers to the seller

t : m → RN
+ . A representative mechanism is denoted M. A pair of an information structure
I and mechanism M comprise a Bayesian game. A Bayes Nash equilibrium of that game is
a prole of strategies σ = (σ1 , . . . , σN ), where σi : Si → ∆ (Mi ) and each player's strategy
maximizes their ex ante welfare:
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Z

Z

Ui (σi , σ−i ; M, I) =

(w (s) qi (m) − ti (m)) (σi , σ−i ) (dm|s) µ (ds) .
s∈S

m∈M

A strategy prole induces revenue

N
X

Z

Z
R (σ; M, I) =
s∈S

ti (m) (σi , σ−i ) (dm|s) µ (ds) .

m∈M i=1

R is a revenue guarantee of the mechanism M if for all I and for all Bayes Nash equilibria
σ of (M, I), R (M, I, σ) ≥ R. R is the revenue guarantee of M if it is a revenue guarantee,
and if there is no higher guarantee.

3

Revenue Guarantee Ranking

We establish a revenue guarantee ranking across a number of classic auction formats, including the rst-price, the second-price and the English auction. We begin the analysis by
establishing a revenue guarantee for the rst-price auction.

3.1

Revenue Guarantee of First-Price Auction

The determination of the revenue guarantee of the rst price auction will use some insights
and formalism established recently in Bergemann et al. (2017a). For a real-vector
we let

x(2)

x(k) denote the k -th highest element of the vector.

Thus,

x ∈ RN ,

x(1) is the rst-order statistic,

is the second-order statistic, etc.
The rst-price auction

MF P A

is dened as follows:

qiF P A (m) =




1
|arg maxj mj |

0

if

Mi = R+ ,

i ∈ arg maxj mj ,

otherwise;

and

tFi P A (m) = qiF P A (m) m(1) .
A specic information structure is given the maximum signal model.
tribution

H(v)

of the common value

v,

the distribution

chosen to satisfy

G (x) = (H (x))1/N .

6

G(si )

For a given dis-

of the individual signal

si

is

Thus, we can interpret the common value

v

to be determined as the maximum of the

N

independent and identical signals:

v (s1 , . . . , sN ) = max {s1 , . . . , sN } .

(1)

Theorem 1 in BBM establishes that the revenue guarantee of the rst-price auction is
given by

RF P A = E(s
where

G (x) = (H (x))1/N .

RF P A

is the expected second-highest of

iid

1 ,...,sN ) ∼ G



s(2)



(2)

In other words, the revenue guarantee in the rst price auction,

N

draws from the cumulative distribution

G.

This

level of revenue is attained in a Bayes Nash equilibrium on the information structure in

si

which bidders receive signals

that are independent draws from

the maximum signal. We call this the
it by

I ∗.

maximum signal

G,

and

w (s) = s(1) ,

i.e.,

information structure, and denote

There is a monotonic pure-strategy equilibrium of the rst-price auction on this

si

information structure in which a type

β

FPA

bids

(si ) = Es

By this, we mean that the strategy

−i

σ (·|si )

i
h
(1) (1)
s−i |s−i ≤ si .
iid
∼G

puts probability one on

(3)

β F P A (si ).

We hereafter

adopt this notation for pure strategies.
Proposition 1 (Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris, 2017a).

The revenue guarantee of the rst-price auction is RF P A . Moreover, the strategies β F P A are


an equilibrium of MF P A , I ∗ and RF P A = R β F P A ; MF P A , I ∗ .
The rst step in the proof of this result establishes that
of

MF P A

in any equilibrium in any information structure.

is an equilibrium in which revenue is

RF P A ,

RF P A is a lower bound on revenue
FPA
The second step shows that β

so that the lower bound is attained. It is this

second step that is the most relevant for the new results in our paper.
The information structure
ture, which we denote by

I∗

I IP V :

is strategically very similar to another information struc-

as before signals are independent draws from

G,

but now

wi (s) = si .
In other words,

I IP V

is the

independent private values

individual values are distributed by
distribution

H

G

but highest value among the

as the value in maximum signal model.

private value model

I

IP V

information structure in which the

derived from

I

∗

N

values has the same

We note that in the independent

, all the bidders except for the bidder with the
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highest signal, have a strictly lower value for the object than in the corresponding common
value model.
It is a standard result that there is a monotonic pure-strategy equilibrium of

MF P A , I IP V

si bids the expected highest of the others' signals, conditional on
FPA
others' signals being less than si , i.e., β
(si ). We can use this to show that β F P A is also an

FPA
equilibrium of M
, I ∗ . First, consider a deviation in which a type si bids β F P A (s0i ) for
0
some si ≤ si . Then the bidder only wins when the highest of the others' signals is less than
si , in which case the highest signal, and hence the value, is just si . The deviator's surplus is
IP V
therefore the same as what it would be in I
, which we know is less than or equal to the
in which a bidder with value

equilibrium surplus. On the other hand, by deviating to a higher bid, the deviator's surplus
would be

Z

s0i

max {x, si } − β

FPA

(s0i )

x=v

 Z s0i


 
N −1
d G (x)
=
(max {x, si } − x) d G (x)N −1
x=v
Z si


=
(si − x) d G (x)N −1 ,
x=v

which is independent of

s0i .

Finally, it is clear that bidding above

β F P A (v)

is not attractive.

From the revenue equivalence theorem (Myerson, 1981), we know that revenue in this
equilibrium must be equal to that of the second-price auction, which is the expected secondhighest value, thus giving us the formula (2).

3.2

Revenue Ranking

Our primary interest is to compare the revenue guarantee of the rst-price auction to that
of other mechanisms.

We will refer to a mechanism as

standard

if (i) messages are one-

dimensional bids and (ii) the high bidder is allocated the good, as in the rst-price auction.
We say a mechanism is

private-value ecient

if there is a monotonic pure-strategy equilib-

rium when values are symmetric, independent, and private. First-price auctions, second-price
auctions, all-pay auctions, and the war-of-attrition are all examples of standard private-value
ecient auctions.
Our rst main result is a ranking of revenue guarantees of standard and private-value
ecient mechanisms.
Theorem 1 (Revenue Guarantee Ranking).

If M is a standard and private-value-ecient mechanism, then RF P A is greater than any
revenue guarantee of M.
To prove the theorem, we rst establish the following result:
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Proposition 2 (Strategic Equivalence).

Suppose that M is a standard mechanism and β is a symmetric monotonic pure-strategy

equilibrium of M, I IP V . Then β is also an equilibrium of (M, I ∗ ).
Proof of Proposition 2.
bidder winning when

When others use the strategy

si ≥ maxj6=i sj

β,

β (si ) must
payment T (si ).

bidding

and making an interim

result in the
This direct

allocation is precisely the one that is induced by the rst-price auction. Moreover, from the
revenue equivalence theorem, we know that the interim expected payment must be the same
as that induced by the rst-price auction,
not on

T F P A (si ),

up to a constant that depends on

i but

si :
T (si ) = T F P A (si ) + ci .

Thus,

si

β (si ) to β (s0i ) in the game (M, I ∗ ) if and

β F P A (si ) to β F P A (s0i ) in the game MF P A , I ∗ .

prots from a deviation to

prots from a deviation from

only if

si

Since the

latter deviation is unprotable, the former must be as well. Finally, it cannot be that there
is any type that wants to deviate to a message that is not sent in equilibrium.

The fact

that there are no atoms implies that for any message, there is an equilibrium message which
induces the same allocation.

If any of the out-of-equilibrium messages were a protable

deviation, they would have to have a lower expected transfer than the equilibrium message,
which contradicts the hypothesis that

β

M, I IP V

is an equilibrium of



.

We now complete the proof of Theorem 1.

Proof of Theorem 1.

To prove the result, we will simply exhibit an information structure

and equilibrium in which revenue is equal to

RF P A .

The information structure is

the private-value eciency hypothesis, we know that

M, I


IP V

in symmetric monotonic pure-strategies, which we denote by
an equilibrium of the game

∗

(M, I ).

β.

I ∗.

From

must have an equilibrium
From Lemma 2,

β

is also

This implies the result, since the revenue-equivalence

theorem implies that



R (β; M, I ∗ ) = R β; M, I IP V ≤ R β F P A ; MF P A , I IP V = RF P A ,
where the inequality follows from the optimality of the rst-price auction with symmetric
and independent private values.
This theorem immediately demonstrates the maxmin optimality of the rst-price auction
among standard and private-value ecient mechanisms.
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Corollary 1 (Optimality of the First-Price Auction).

The rst-price auction maximizes the revenue guarantee among standard mechanisms that
are private-value ecient.
In particular, the rst-price auction has a greater revenue guarantee than second-price
auctions, English auctions, all-pay auctions, the war of attrition, and all combinations of
these mechanisms. While Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 only show a weak ranking, in the case
of second-price and English auctions, the ranking is clearly strict, since these mechanisms
have bidding ring equilibria in which one bidder makes a high bid and the others eectively

2

do not participate in the auction.

4

Revenue Guarantee Equivalence

The notion of a revenue guarantee in Section 2 requires that the revenue bound holds across
all equilibria.

We could therefore have quite easily concluded that the second-price and

English auctions would have lower revenue guarantees than the rst-price auction, without
the use of Theorem 1, since the former mechanisms have bidding ring equilibria in which
one bidder bids a large amount and the others bid zero. We might nd the revenue ranking
unappealing if it depended on the unfavorable selection of such equilibria, especially since
the second-price and English auctions are known to have very appealing equilibria in wellbehaved environments, such as the aliated values setting studied by MW. Our next result
shows that even if we restrict attention to aliated values information structures and if we
select the monotonic pure-strategy equilibrium, the rst-price auction still performs weakly
better than the second-price and English auctions. In fact, they all perform equally well.
We now proceed formally. An information structure has
for all

f (s),

i,

(ii)

π

aliated signals

if (i)

Si = R

is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure and has a density

and (iii) the density

f

is aliated in the sense of MW, i.e.,

aliated values information structure
also satises (iv)

wi (s)

f

is log supermodular. An

is an information structure with aliated signals and

is weakly increasing in each coordinate.

A second-price auction

MSP A

has an allocation rule

q SP A = q F P A

that is the same as

that of the rst-price auction, but the payment is the second-highest bid, i.e.,

A
tSP
(m) = qiSP A (m) m(2) .
i
2 In personal communication, Ziwei Wang has given an example of an information structure and equilibrium in which revenue from the all-pay auction is strictly lower than RF P A .
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As MW show, when values are aliated, this mechanism has a monotonic pure-strategy
equilibrium in which a type

si

bids

h
i
(1)
β SP A (si ) = Eµ w (s0 ) |s0i = si , s−i = si .
R

We say that

is an

aliated values revenue guarantee for the second-price auction

any aliated values information structure

the

I , R β SP A ; MSP A , I



≥ R.

if for

As before,

R

is

revenue guarantee if it is a revenue guarantee and it is greater than any other revenue

guarantee.

MEA has messages that are actually collections of mappings mIi :
I ⊆ N \ {i} that say, as a function of the drop-out prices of bidders in
∅
bidder i should drop out of the auction. Our convention is that mi is a

The English auction

RI+ → R+ for all
I , at which price

constant. A prole of messages induces an outcome wherein the rst bidder to drop is the
one with the smallest

m∅i ,

bidder drops out at price

which is the price at which that bidder drops out, and the second

mij m∅i



, etc. The auction ends when only one bidder remains,

and the remaining bidder gets the good (breaking ties equally if more than one bidder drops
out simultaneously to end the auction), and pays the price at which the penultimate bidder
dropped out. For a more formal description of the English auction, see MW. They show that
there is an equilibrium of this game in which, conditional on the rst
out at prices

y

N −1

≤ ··· ≤ y

N −1−K

, a bidder with signal

si ≥ y

N −1−K

K

bidders dropping

drops out at price

i
h

(k)
(k)
β EA si , y N −1 , . . . , y N −1+K = Eµ w (s0 ) |s0i = si , s−i = y k ∀k ≥ N − 1 + K, s−i = si ∀k ≤ N − K .
We say that

R

is an

aliated values revenue guarantee for the English auction

aliated values information structure



I , R β EA ; MEA , I ≥ R.

if for any

The revenue guarantee is

the best possible such guarantee.
Theorem 2 (Revenue Guarantee Equivalence).

The second-price auction and the English auction have the same aliated values revenue
guarantee as the rst-price auction given by RF P A .
Proof of Theorem 2.

The proof proceeds by two short steps.

Step 1: MW show that for any aliated values information structure, there is an equilibrium of the rst-price auction in which revenue is lower than both

R β EA ; MEA , I



R β SP A ; MSP A , I



and

. This proves that revenue in the second-price and English auctions must

RF P A .
∗
structure I

be at least the revenue guarantee of the rst-price auction,
Step 2:

It is easy to verify that the information

is symmetric and has

aliated values. Moreover, the equilibria of the second-price and English auctions reduces

11

to bidding your signal and dropping out when the price reaches your signal, respectively.
Both of these equilibria induce revenue equal to the expected second-highest signal, which
is

RF P A .
In a sense, Theorem 2 shows that the information structure

I∗

has the strongest winner's

curse of any aliated values environment with the given distribution over the common value.
By winner's curse, we mean the adverse selection from winning the good under a mechanism
and equilibrium in which the high-signal bidder is allocated the good. It is well known that
the presence of a winner's curse induces the bidders to shade their bids, so that they bid based
on their pivotal value on the marginal event that they win. This updating is particularly
severe in the maximum signal information structure
the highest signal means that the value is

exactly

I ∗.

To wit, here learning that one has

equal to one's own signal, whereas at the

lower bound on the true
value of the object. Thus, at interim stage, the signal of each bidder is the greatest lower
bound for the value, and at the ex-post stage, the signal of the winning bidder is least upper
bound.
moment when the bidder only knows his own signal, it is only a

If we measure the degree of adverse selection in terms of the dierence between expected
value and expected revenue, that dierence is the largest under the monotonic equilibrium
of

I ∗,

regardless of which of the standard auctions we use to measure the eect.

Thus, we nd that when we restrict attention to well-behaved (symmetric and aliated
value) environments, second-price and English auctions do no better than the rst-price
auction in the worst case.

At the same time, if we relax these hypotheses (symmetry,

aliated values, favorable equilibrium selection), the worst-case for the rst-price auction
must remain the same, while for these other mechanisms it can only decrease.

5
5.1

Extensions
Revenue Guarantee Rankings with Interdependent Values

The analysis of the rst-price auction in BBM goes well beyond the common value case. In
that paper, we characterize the revenue guarantee of the rst-price auction as long as the
joint distribution of values

π is exchangeable, thus including interdependent as well as private

values. We could similarly extend the robust revenue ranking of Theorem 1 to cover this
more general environment with minimal conceptual innovation, although some additional
notation is required.
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In general, the critical worst-case information structure is dened as follows.

v ∈ RN

realized vector of values

among the

N

1
α (v) =
N −1
denote the average of the
where

v

N −1

bidders, let

!
X

π.

vi − v (1)

i∈N

lowest values.

is distributed according to

For any

Let

H

denote the distribution of

We continue to maintain the hypothesis that

α (v),
H has

no atoms. In the critical information structure, the bidders receive as before independent
one-dimensional signals

si ∼ G (x) = (H (x))1/N .
The values can then be written in terms of the signals as follows:

wi (s) =


s ,

if

i

E

π





v (1) |α (v) = si ,

si ∈
/ H (s) ;

otherwise.

N −1 lowest values, and the high-value
∗
denote this information structure by I .

Thus, the highest signal is equal to the average of the
bidder gets the highest signal. We continue to

The rst-price auction continues to have an equilibrium on this information structure
which is described by (3), which attains the generalized revenue guarantee, still given by (2)
(although with the redened

G

and

H ).

This is shown in BBM. Moreover, by exactly the

same steps as in the proof of Theorem 1, we could show that any standard and private-value
ecient mechanism

M

must have an equilibrium with the same expected revenue, so that

any revenue guarantee of

M must be weakly less than RF P A .

The only step in the proof that

changes is that when we evaluate a downward deviation, the deviator's value is even higher
than it would be in the as if  independent private value model
deviations are even less attractive than before.

I IP V .

Thus, downward

The argument for upward deviations is

unchanged, and in fact bidders are indierent to all upward deviations.

5.2

Revenue Guarantee Equivalence with Interdependent Values

Generalizing Theorem 2 is more subtle.
aliated.

The interdependent values version of

I∗

To see why, consider a simple case in which there are two bidders and

independent draws from the cumulative distribution

F.

In that case, under

I

∗

is not

vi

are

, the bid-

ders receive independent signals, and the highest signal is equal to the smallest value:
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maxi=1,2 si = mini=1,2 vi .

F

to be uniform on


s ,

if

si < sj ;

 1+si ,

otherwise.

For example, if we take

wi (s) =

i

2

Thus, there is a downward jump in the value function

[0, 1],

then

wi (s) as a function of sj

when

sj = si .

This discontinuity means that there are multiple monotonic pure strategy equilibria. In
particular, bidding

si

is an equilibrium, but so is bidding

(1 + si ) /2.

In either case, the

equilibrium winner will be the bidder with the higher value, and the winner always pays a
price less than their value, so that downward deviations are not attractive. On the other
hand, increasing one's bid generally leads to a downward jump in the value on the marginal
event when one wins, so upward deviations are not attractive either.

Similarly, there are

multiple monotonic pure-strategy equilibria of the rst-price auction, with the one described
by (3) being the lowest. In the uniform example, the lowest equilibrium of the FPA is to bid

1
β (si ) =
G (si )

Z

si

xdG (x) ,
x=0

but it is easily veried that the following monotonic strategy is also an equilibrium:

1
β (si ) =
G (si )
in which revenue is strictly higher.

Z

si

x=0

1+x
dG (x) ,
2

In eect, when there is a gap between the highest

and second-highest values, there are dierent equilibria corresponding to dierent ways of
selecting which value in the gap is treated as the value in the pivotal event where the
bidders tie.
So, in order to generalize Theorem 2 beyond common values, we have to both expand the
range of information structures that we consider, and also to decide which of the symmetric
and monotonic pure-strategy equilibrium the bidders should play.
follows. We will say that an information structure is one of

This can be done as

generalized aliated values

if

the signals are aliated and if the value function can be written as

wi (s) = ŵi (s) + Isi ≥maxj6=i sj w̃i (s)
where ]

ŵi

is monotonic and

w̃i

is non-negative. It is easily veried that when information

is symmetric and generalized aliated, there are monotonic pure-strategy equilibria of rstprice, second-price, and English auctions, where bidders act as if  the value function were

ŵi .

We refer to this as the

minimal monotonic equilibrium.
14

Moreover, the linkage principle

of MW applies to these equilibria, so that revenue in this equilibrium is greater under the
English auction than it is under the second-price auction than it is under the rst-price auction. We dene the

generalized aliated values revenue guarantee

to be minimum revenue in

the minimal monotonic equilibrium across all generalized aliated values information structures with the given prior as a mean-preserving spread. The linkage principle implies that
the generalized aliated values revenue guarantee for the rst-price auction is weakly lower
than that of second-price and English auctions. Finally,

I∗

is a generalized aliated values

information structure, and in this information structure, the minimal monotonic equilibria
of these auctions are all revenue equivalent. Thus, we conclude that rst-price, second-price,
and English auctions all have the same generalized aliated values revenue guarantee.

5.3

Auctions with Reserve Prices

It is well-known that adding a minimum bid can raise revenue in private value environments.
This occurs when there are bidder types that have relatively low gains from trade compared
to their information rent.

We can extend our results to the case where there is a reserve

price. Specically, consider the rst-price auction with reserve

qiF P A (m) =




1
|W (m)|

0

if

r,

denoted

MF P A (r):

i ∈ W (m) ;

otherwise,

where


W (m) = i ∈ N |mi = m(1) , mi ≥ r
is the set of high bidders whose bids exceed the reserve, and

tFi P A (m) = qiF P A (m) m(1) .
Note that this is a dierent mechanism from the no-reserve rst-price auction considered
above, and hence it has a distinct revenue-minimizing information structure.
that it has the following structure: Let
Bidder

i's

xi

signal is

si =


x
r

where

v̂

be independent draws from

solves

Z

i

if

xi ≥ v̂;

otherwise,

v̂

vH (dv) = r.
v=0
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BBM show

G (x) = (H (x))1/N .

The value function is again simply

w (s) = s(1) .
I ∗ (r). We can think of this information structure
∗
as being derived from I , where signals below v̂ are pooled together as a single signal r . The
cuto v̂ is chosen so that the expected value is r conditional on the highest signal being r .
We denote this information structure by

As before, there is a monotonic pure-strategy equilibrium of the rst-price auction:

β F P A (s; r) =


0

if

o
i
h
n
Es max r, s(1) |s(1) ≤ si
−i
−i
−i

otherwise.

si = r;

BBM show that this information structure and equilibrium achieve the revenue guarantee of

MF P A (r),

which is

RF P A (r) = E(x

1 ,...,xN


 (2)

max
r,
x
I
(1) ≥v̂ .
x
)∼G
iid

Again, there is a strategic equivalence result that says that the same strategies would be
an equilibrium even if bidders treated their signals as private values.
information structure by

I IP V (r) is
price of r , thus

I

IP V

(r).

Let us denote this

Moreover, the revenue equivalence theorem says that

revenue on

the same as what would obtain with a second-price auction with a

reserve

yielding the formula for

RF P A (r).

We could extend Theorem 1 to reserve price auctions as follows. Suppose there is another
mechanism

M,

that results in the same allocation in

or English auction with reserve

r,

I IP V (r).

This could be a second-price

or it could be an all-pay auction, albeit with a dierent

reserve price. In order to have an apples-to-apples comparison, we hold the screening level
xed, so that the allocation is conditionally ecient when the highest value is greater than

r,

r. The fact
IP V
that these mechanisms are revenue equivalent to the rst-price auction on I
(r), and the
IP V
∗
strategic equivalence of the induced direct mechanism between I
(r) and I (r), means
that there is an equilibrium and information structure in which M has revenue equal to
RF P A (r), so the revenue guarantee for M is weakly below RF P A (r).
∗
Theorem 2 can be extended as well. The type space I (r) is still one of aliated values,
but the seller keeps the good when the highest value is weakly less than

and the revenue ranking of MW in aliated environments extends to rst-price, secondprice, and English auctions with a common reserve price (
Moreover, the equilibrium

β

FPA

(·; r)

ibid,

Section 7, pp. 1111-1113).

coincides with the one described by MW. Thus, we

conclude that rst-price, second-price, and English auctions with reserve price
guarantee equivalent, with a guarantee of

R

FPA
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(r).

r

are revenue

5.4

Revenue Guarantee Equivalence with Other Mechanisms

Theorem 1 is quite general and covers all standard and private-value-ecient mechanisms.
Theorem 2, on the other hand, is specic to rst-price, second-price, and English auctions.
Theorem 2 would extend to cover a mechanism

M if that mechanism generates weakly more

revenue than the rst-price auction when values are symmetric and aliated. While MW
prove this revenue ranking for second-price and English auctions, their proof technique can
be adapted to cover more mechanisms. In particular, the critical feature of the second-price
auction that yields the revenue ranking is that (i) only the winner pays and (ii) the winner's

ibid, Theorem 15, p.

payment is increasing in other bidder's reports (

1109). Any mechanism

that satises the same conditions and has an equilibrium in monotonic pure-strategies must
generate weakly more revenue than the rst-price auction. Thus, for example, Theorem 2
would extend to cover convex combinations of rst-price and second-price auctions, where the
winner pays a weighted average of the highest and second-highest bids, provided a monotonic
equilibrium exists. Lizzeri and Persico (2000) proved existence of a monotonic equilibrium
when there are two bidders.
In addition, we expect that the characterization of aliated revenue guarantees can be
extended beyond monotonic winning payments. Krishna and Morgan (1997) give conditions
under which the all-pay auction and the war-of-attrition always generate more revenue than
the rst-price auction. Theorem 2 will extend to these mechanisms as well, as long as

I∗

satises their additional conditions, which boils down to a hazard rate condition on the
distribution

G.

The takeaway is that Theorem 2 can extend well-beyond second-price and

English auctions.

5.5

Releasing More Information

MW famously gave conditions under which releasing public information about the value will
raise revenue from rst-price, second-price, and English auctions.

Analogous results hold

for revenue guarantees. First, suppose the seller has access to a signal that can be publicly
revealed to the bidders. We claim that for any mechanism, revealing the signal must raise the
revenue guarantee. Why? Since all information structures are allowed, it is always possible
that the bidders' already have access to this signal. Revealing the signal may, however, rule
out some information structures, e.g., no information, so that the revenue guarantee will
weakly increase. At the same time, our revenue guarantee ranking will continue to hold ex
post for each realized public signal, so that the ranking continues to hold ex ante as well.
Similarly, revenue guarantee equivalence would continue to hold if the seller releases public
information that is aliated with the value, as long as we restrict attention to information

17

structures that are jointly aliated with the value and the public signal. Again, conditional
on the public signal, the information structure is still aliated.

At the same time, it is

possible that conditional on the public signal, the bidders' get independent signals and the
maximum signal is equal to the value. Thus, revenue guarantee equivalence will hold ex post
conditional on each realization of the public signal.
The bottom line is that releasing public information always helps the seller, but it is also
preserves the dominance of the rst-price auction in terms of revenue guarantees.

6

Conclusion

We presented a novel version of the revenue equivalence and revenue ranking theorems.
We compared the auction format in terms of a revenue guarantee across all information
environments rather than in terms of the revenue from a specic information environment.
The revenue guarantee identied the greatest lower bound across all information structures
(and all equilibria).

This analysis yields a powerful new argument in favor of rst-price

auctions as achieving a greater revenue guarantee than other standard mechanisms, such as
second-price and English auctions.
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